Motivated by real life decision problems, we model a boundedly rational choice procedure, called choice by iterative elimination, where an alternative might not be compared by all available alternatives. Our decision maker continues her limited search until she finds an alternative which is optimal within its consideration set. We study properties of this procure and provide a full characterization. While our behavioral postulates enable the model to accommodate seemingly irrational behavior, such as the Attraction Effect and "less is more" phenomena, they rule out choice cycles. Moreover, we also identify preferences from a boundedly rational behavior to make welfare analysis possible.
I. Introduction
Classical choice theory assumes that a decision maker chooses the best among all available alternatives. Even most models of bounded rationality assume that if a particular alternative is chosen, it must have been compared (in some sense) with all alternatives within the budget set. However, it is difficult to imagine that people always inspect all available alternatives.
For example, one could easily spend a whole afternoon choosing among 300 different breakfast cereals offered in a regular size supermarket. Indeed, there are many studies reporting that people do not consider all available options before making decisions.
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This paper proposes a new descriptive model of decision making that allows this boundedly rational behavior. The choice procedure is built on three components: the starting point, the consideration set, and the elimination stage. Our procedure (or "search") starts with one particular alternative, say x 0 . Our decision maker searches for something better than x 0 . However, she does not compare x 0 with all feasible alternatives, possibly because there are too many available alternatives. Instead, she performs a limited search by paying attention to alternatives which are comparable to x 0 . We call the set of elements with which she compares x 0 consideration set of x 0 . If she cannot find any better alternative than x 0 in the consideration set, x 0 will be chosen. Otherwise, she picks the best element within the consideration set of x 0 , say x 1 , as the next contemplation point. Then she continues searching for the best element in the consideration set of x 1 . This process continues until she find an alternative which is optimal within its consideration set. Therefore, our choice procedure is dynamic, incorporating the idea of search into modeling decision making. We call this choice behavior Choice by Iterative Elimination (CIE). The following (hypothetical) example illustrates our model. Ms. Dema has recently graduated and offered a tenure-track position at a University of Michigan; she needs a car to get around Ann Arbor. She searches by brand -her search starts with a specific brand of automobile, say x 0 . There might be different possibilities why she focuses on this particular car. For instance, (1) it is recommended by her friends, neighbors, or colleagues, (2) she 1 Marketing literature provides sizeable amount of evidence on this issue, for example, Roberts and Lattin [1991] , Mitra [1995] , and Erdem and Swait [2004] . Obtain (or construct) the consideration set of the contemplated alternative
Is there any alternative better than the contemplated alternative within its consideration set? Yes
No
Choose it
Eliminate it, Pick the "best" element in the current consideration set as the next contemplation point to repeat the elimination process Pick another element in S to repeat the elimination process, has seen it in a James Bond movie, or (3) she had owned an older model of x 0 , etc. Since this purchase may be the most expensive by far in her life, she wonders if there is a better car she can afford. Because there are so many makes and models on the market, her task is formidable if she compares x 0 with all of them. At very least, it is not worth sacrificing the time she could spend working on her next research paper. Instead, she seeks the advice of a colleague of her, Mr. Recag. He suggests several cars which he believes she may like better than x 0 . This list can be thought as her consideration set of x 0 . If there is no car which she likes better than x 0 within the consideration set of x 0 , she is convinced to buy car x 0 . Otherwise she eliminates x 0 and continues her search by picking the best car, say x 1 , among the recommended cars. She again goes back to Mr. Recag (or another colleague) to ask the list of cars comparable to x 1 . This new list might include new cars that were not in the initial consideration set. She then searches the best car within the new list. If x 1 is the best one, she will pick x 1 , otherwise she continues this process by picking the best car in the new list. This process stops whenever she finds an alternative which is optimal given its consideration set. At the end of this process, she may end up with an alternative that was not initially considered.
Since consumers have only a finite amount of time, knowledge, and/or attention available for a particular decision problem, usage of consideration sets is inevitable to reduce a complex problem into a much more manageable one (Payne [1982] and Payne et al. [1988] ). In above example, the consideration set is the recommendations of her colleague, which is an external aid. Another example for such external aid could be a car-review web-site such as edmunds.com. However, it is also possible that the consideration set is a reflection of the psychological or cognitive constraint in the mind of a decision maker.
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Chakravarti and Janiszewski [2003] Our main objective is to identify choice behaviors consistent with our choice by iterative elimination model. We show that if choice data is compatible with the CIE model, it satisfies two simple properties, which we call the Anchor Bias and the Dominating Anchor Axiom.
Moreover, if choice data satisfies these axioms, we can endogenously derive both consideration sets and the ranking of alternatives of the decision maker. The key feature of our approach is that our assumptions are stated in terms of choice experiments. Therefore, a revealed preference type analysis can be used to test the CIE model, unlike many other bounded rationality models often seen in the marketing literature.
The main principle of the classical choice theory is the independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA): the addition or deletion of irrelevant alternatives should not cause a choice reversal. Considerable evidence has been provided to demonstrate that the IIA property does not hold in many real life situations (Tversky [1972] , Tversky and Sattath [1979], Heath and Chatterjee [1995] , Huber et al. [1982] , Tversky and Simonson [1993] , and Tversky and Kahneman [1991] ). Since our model does not suffer from this assumption, it offers an intuitive explanation for violations of IIA such as the attraction and the asymmetric dominance effects.
2 The consideration set could be generated by a combination of an external aid and a cognitive constraint.
For example, she uses a web search engine but she compares x only with the alternative in the first page of the search results. In this case, her consideration set depends on both the current contemplation point and her budget set.
Understanding these effects are vital to predict how market shares change if new products are introduced or old ones are withdrawn from the market (even though they are not popular).
Although our model can accommodate a wide range of boundedly rational behavior, our agents are immune to the classical Dutch-book (or money pumping) argument.
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The main advantage of our model over other models of bounded rationality is its simplicity. Ironically, some of these models, which are introduced to capture the limitations of human minds, are so complicated that decision makers who follow those models should have essentially unlimited time and knowledge. Therefore, as Todd and Gigerenzer [2000] note, these models let the idea of perfect rationality to sneak in through the back door. In contrast, the consideration set is the only source of bounded rationality in our model, which may come from an external decision aid, for instance, the use of e-commerce sites. If this case, our agent does not need to spend time and knowledge to figure out the relevant consideration set. Therefore, unlike models referred in Todd and Gigerenzer [2000] , our model exhibits bounded rationality without imposing any extra cognitive load on the decision maker.
In addition to its generality and congruence with real world, our model has a wide range of applications. A recent interesting paper, Eliaz and Spiegler [2007] , investigates the implications of a particular version of the CIE model in an industrial organization setting where two profit maximizing firms face boundedly rational consumers. They consider a market with two firms each of which offers a variety of products. Each consumer has a default firm and considers products of the rival firm if and only if the rival firm offers some products which are similar to the best item of the default firm. The behavior of such a consumer satisfies our axioms, and thus it can be represented by the CIE model. Therefore, their paper illustrates tractability of the CIE model.
Identifying the preference of a decision maker from the choice data is a crucial issue particularly for the purpose of welfare analysis. As Bernheim and Rangel [2008] pointed out, it is typically difficult to identify preference from boundedly rational behavior. In turns out that we can "partially" pin down her preference in our model. We say x is revealed 3 There are some choice procedures which lie outside of our model such as the (u, v) procedure (Kalai et al. [2002] ), the "second-best" procedure (Baigent and Gaertner [1996] ) and the "median" procedure (Gaertner and Xu [1999] ). The reason is that they all allow strict cycles which are not permitted in our model. preferred to y if x is chosen from some set with y being the starting point. Our assumptions guarantees that this revealed preference has no contradictions, i.e. no cycles.
We assume that we can observe not only what the decision maker chooses from a budget set but also which alternative she initially contemplates. With the explosion of data mining technologies data on starting points is often available. Salant and Rubinstein [2008] where a reference point is exogenously given. A major difference of the present work from these studies is that the CIE model is a sequential choice procedure, as opposed to their static models. Our model provides a complete description of a dynamic search model.
The induced choice correspondence is also closely related to the reference-dependent choice literature where the reference point is determined endogenously. Note that if x ∈ C c (S) then we must have x = c(S, x). That is, x is a self-fulfilling plan if we interpret a starting point as an expectation. Therefore, our induced choice correspondence consists of all selffulfilling plans. This is in line with the personal equilibrium proposed in Köszegi and Rabin [2006] .
II. Model
Throughout this paper X will stand for an arbitrary non-empty finite set, with each element of X a potential choice alternative (or prize). Let K(X) denote the set of all nonempty closed subsets of X. By a extended choice problem, we mean a list (S, x 0 ) where S ∈ K(X) and x 0 ∈ S where S is a budget set and x 0 is a starting point. The interpretation is that the individual is confronted with the problem of choosing an alternative from the feasible set S while she is initially contemplating alternative x 0 .
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The starting point is the alternative that the decision maker is initially paying attention to. There could be different reasons for having a certain starting point. For example, (i) it could be her default option or status quo, (ii) it is what she expects to buy in the market, (iii) she might hear about it from someone in her social network, and (iv) she is exposed to advertisements for it. The extended choice problem captures the idea of the initial stages having an impact on the later stages of the process and the final decision. For example, starting search with a very expensive item, as opposed to a very cheap item, can make a moderately expensive item choosable (e.g., Kardes [1986] , Parducci and Fabre [1995] , Sherman et al. [1978] ).
To help illustrate our model, we shall employ an example throughout the rest of the paper.
We consider Ms. Dema, who is buying a cellular phone. For some reason (perhaps because of a successful advertisement effort), cell phone x grabs her attention. In the terminology of this paper, then, her choice problem is one where the starting point is cell phone x and the feasible set is the set of cell phones she can afford. Alternatively, if she expected to buy a new model of cell phone y since she always uses this brand, then her extended choice problem is one with the same feasible set and a different starting point.
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An extended choice function assigns a single chosen element to each extended choice problem. That is, c(S, x 0 ) ∈ S for every extended choice problem. Before we introduce our main concept, "Choice by Iterative Elimination (CIE)", we discuss its two basic components: a ranking of alternatives and consideration sets.
5 Masatlioglu and Ok [2005] , Salant and Rubinstein [2008] and Bernheim and Rangel [2008] , use similar frameworks in which x 0 is interpreted as a status quo, a frame, and ancillary conditions, respectively. 6 discuss this issue later.
A ranking, which is typically denoted by P , is a strict order over X, which has the same property as a strict preference in standard theory. 7 xP y is interpreted as "the decision maker considers x better than y if she actually compares them." We assume that such a comparison is rational, in the sense that P has the same properties as standard preferences. If xP y for all y ∈ S \ {x}, we call x is the P -best in S.
8
A consideration set of x under choice problem S, denoted by Ω(x, S) ⊂ S, consists of elements which the decision maker considers when she currently contemplates x in choice problem S. In other words, Ω(x, S) is the set of alternatives that are taken seriously by consumers when x is the contemplation point, so we assume that x ∈ Ω(x, S). We call Ω(·, ·) a consideration set mapping.
Given these components, we are ready to define a choice by constraint elimination.
DEFINITION 1: An extended choice function c is a Choice by Iterative Elimination (CIE)
if there exist a ranking P and a consideration set mapping Ω such that, for every extended choice problem (S, x 0 ), there exists a sequence of contemplation points (x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x n , y) with
• y = c(S, x 0 ) is the P -best element in both Ω(x n , S) and Ω(y, S).
When c is represented by (P, Ω) in the sense of Definition 1, we say (P, Ω) represents c.
Occasionally, we mention that P represents c, which means that there exists some Ω such that (P, Ω) represents c.
Let c be a choice by iterative elimination. If y = c(S, x 0 ) and y = x 0 , then there is a sequence of contemplations points starting from x 0 and ending at y. In the first step, the decision maker contemplates x 0 , but discards it since there are some alternatives in Ω(x 0 , S)
which are better (with respect to P ) than x 0 . Then she picks the P -best element in Ω(x 0 , S)
denoted by x 1 (note that x 1 must be better than x 0 ) to start the next stage of the process.
7 A binary relation P on X is a strict order over X if it is asymmetric (xP y implies not yP x) and negatively transitive ("not xP y" and "not yP z" imply "not xP z.") 8 This element might not exist for some S.
This process continues until the decision maker reaches y. Her final choice will be y because y is the P -best element in Ω(y, S). We can think y as the fixed point of this decision process.
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The source of bounded rationality in the CIE model is the usage of consideration sets that restrict the range of search. Hence, the decision maker may choose an alternative which she would have discarded if she had compared it with all alternatives in her budget set. The opposite cannot happen; if she has discarded an alternative when her consideration set is restricted, she would have eliminated it without the restriction.
Before we proceed to the representation result, we will discuss several interesting properties of choice by iterative elimination. These are (i) it does not satisfy the main assumption of standard choice theory (IIA), (ii) it accommodates the "less is more" phenomena, and (iii) it provides a new explanation for the attraction effect.
We show that even when we fix the starting point, our extended choice function does not satisfy the assumption of standard theory -Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). To see this in a simple example, we employ a particular version of CIE where the consideration sets depend on the budget in a trivial way. That is, the consideration set of x under choice problem S consists of alternatives that are both comparable to x and feasible, i.e. Ω(x, S) = Ω * (x) ∩ S where Ω * (x) is the set of alternatives that are comparable to x.
Assume that Ms. Dema follows this restrictive version of CIE. There are three cell phones with a camera, x, y, and z. While x and y can also capture videos, x can be used as a MP3
player. Her ranking among three cell phones is xP yP z. Her consideration sets include relatively similar items to the contemplated alternative:
and Ω * (z) = {y, z}. We focus her extended choice problems where the starting point is always z. Given that z is the starting point, she moves away from z only if y is available since y is the only alternative in the consideration set of z and is ranked higher than z. Hence, if only x and z are available, her choice will be z, z = c({x, z}, z). However, her choice will be y if the budget set consists of y and z, y = c({y, z}, z). More interestingly, she will pick x if all three alternatives are available, x = c({x.y, z}, z) by following the path of contemplation points, z → y → x. Note that x is chosen even though it does not belong to the initial consideration set. We observe the following pattern of choices, x = c({x, y, z}, z), z = c({x, z}, z) and y = c({y, z}, z)
that cannot be represented by any preference relation. Therefore, an outside observer might interpret this choice behavior as irrational. However, Simon [1998] argues that a seemingly irrational behavior could be procedurally rational and he emphasizes the distinction between "substantive" and "procedural" rationality. While the former refers to the rationality of the final choices, the latter focuses on the process by which the final choice was obtained. Our CIE model might seem substantively irrational, but is procedurally rational, as demonstrated in the example.
Next we show that having more options might induce a decision maker to make a worse choice. Consider Ms. Dema's choice problem with an additional cell phone t, a camera phone with e-mail. Her ranking is xP tP yP z and her consideration sets are Ω * (x) = {x, y},
and Ω * (t) = {z, t}. Let z be the starting point. If all the alternatives are available, she will pick the second best alternative, t, since t is the P -best element both in Ω * (z) and Ω * (t). On the other hand, if t is removed from feasible set, then y is P -best element in Ω * (z) ∩ {x, y, z}. However, y is not the final choice since x is P -best element in Ω * (y) ∩ {x, y, z}. Hence, having fewer options makes it possible to choose the first best, x. Hence, "less is more."
Since our model does not suffer from IIA, it provides a simple explanation for the attraction effect (Heath and Chatterjee [1995] and Huber et al. [1982] ), which is a violation of IIA. The attraction effect refers to a phenomenon in which adding an irrelevant alternative into an existing choice set increases the proportion of people choosing an alternative from the original set. Since empirical and experimental data supporting the attraction effect rely on the aggregation of choice behaviors, for simplicity, we assume that everybody follows the common underlying CIE model and every alternative becomes the starting point with equal probability. For example, the probability of x being the starting point is 1/2 and 1/3 from the doubletons and tripletons, respectively. Although the decision maker deterministically chooses from a set, her choice will be random since the starting point is created by an underlying random process.
Consider the following CIE model where there are three alternatives, x, y, and d y . Since x and y are undominated anchors since they will be chosen whenever they are starting points. That is why both will have equal share from {x, y}. However, when the budget set is {x, y, d y }, the share of y is twice as high as the share of x. The reason is that having d y as a starting point will lead people to choose y at the end. That is, the addition of d y to {x, y} increases the propotion of individuals choosing y even though no one chooses d y . We can generalize this result for budgets set including more than one decoy options: the more decoys for y are present, the higher the share of y is.
Since our model can accommodate many different (seemingly irrational) behavior one may argue that the CIE model can explain any choice behavior. The following example illustrates that this claim is false.
EXAMPLE 1: Let X = {x, y, z} and c({x, y}, y) = {x}, c({y, z}, z) = {y}, and c({x, z}, x) = {z}. Assume that decision maker's choice behavior can be rationalized by a pair (P, Ω). Then c({x, y}, y) = {x}, reveals that y is eliminated by x. Therefore, it must be xP y. Similarly we must have xP yP zP x which contradicts that P is a ranking. Therefore, this choice behavior is not a CIE.
Given the proceeding example, we look for necessary and sufficient condition for the CIE model. As we see before, the final choice is always the fixed point of this decision process since c(S, x 0 ) must be the P -best element in Ω(c(S, x 0 ), S). This implies that if y = c(S, x 0 ) then it must be y = c(S, y). This is a necessary requirement for our decision process. The next axiom imposes this structure on the extended choice function.
Anchor Bias Axiom: For any S, y = c(S, x 0 ) implies y = c(S, y).
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This axiom states that if a decision maker chooses y from S under some circumstances (for example, x 0 is the initially contemplated alternative), then she will not change her mind when she initially considers y in S. 11 We should note that this axiom is restrictive. For example, it does not allow variety-seeking behavior: c(S, x) = y and c(S, y) = z under the assumption that the starting point is the past consumption. 12 The next axiom is also necessary for our model.
This axiom first states that any budget set S has at least one alternative x * which will prevent all other alternatives in S from being chosen in any choice problem whenever x * is the starting point. Particularly, as long as x * is initially considered, x * must be chosen from any subset of S (including S itself). In other words, for any budget set, either x * or another alternative which does not belong to S is chosen whenever x * is initially contemplated.
Example 1 does not satisfy the Dominating Anchor axiom. What is a dominating anchor (or x * ) for the set S = {x, y, z}? It cannot be x since x does not dominate z even when it is the starting point. Similarly, neither y nor z can be. Therefore, the Dominating Anchor axiom is violated.
From a normative point of view, this axiom is the necessary and sufficient condition for the decision maker to be immune to the classical money-pumping argument. To see the necessity, suppose this axiom is violated for some S. That is, for all α ∈ S, there exists T α including α such that α = β = c(T α , α) and β ∈ S. Then, one can exploit her in the following fasion: Suppose she currently owns x ∈ S. Then, she is willing to pay a small amount of her wealth when she is offered budget T x to exchange x with y(= c(T x , x)) ∈ S. Similarly, she is willing to pay some amount when she is offered budget T y to exchange y with something else in S. Because S is finite, she will eventually end up with the same element she owned before but with less money. To see the sufficiency, assume that the decision maker is willing to move from x to y, y to z, and z to x, i.e. y = c(T x , x), z = c(T y , y), x = c(T z , z) for some 11 Different versions of this axiom have been named "Status Quo Bias" (Masatlioglu and Ok [2005] , "No
Regret" (Sagi [2006] ), and "strict exchange aversion" (Sugden [2003] ). 12 This axiom can be removed if we change the definition of choice by iterative elimination. In this case, the decision rule says that pick the P -best element in Ω(S, x 0 ) without checking whether it is the P -best element in its consideration set or not. But then we lose the dynamic nature of the CIE model. Anchor axioms, then there exist a ranking of alternatives P and a consideration set map-
ping Ω that represent c. As in the revealed preference approach, we derive both P and Ω endogenously from the decision maker's choice behavior. However, the questions regarding the determinants and/or sources of Ω are beyond the scope of this paper.
Identifying the preference of a decision maker from the choice data is a crucial issue particularly for the purpose of welfare analysis. Since our model is context-dependent, we cannot uniquely pin down her preferences from her extended choice behavior. In other words,
given an extended choice function, there are many rankings which represent it. Instead, we provide a partial uniqueness result: there exists a partial order based on unambiguous comparison such that any ranking representing c should include this order.
When we observe c(S, x 0 ) = x 0 , there are many possibilities. For example, (i) x 0 is ranked above all the other alternatives in S or (ii) x 0 is the worst element in S but the consideration set of x 0 consists of only x 0 . In other words, the decision maker does not reveal any preference in this case. To conclude that x is revealed preferred to y in our frame work, we should observe that x is chosen from some set with y being the starting point.
We argue that this ranking (which may be incomplete) is the revealed preference. In other words, we will show that for given a CIE model, there exists a strict partial order c such that if c can be represented by P (with appropriately chosen Ω) then P must include c .
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That is, if x c y then it must be xP y.
Suppose the decision maker's choice behavior admits a CIE. Given two alternatives x and y, observing x = c(S, y) for some S directly reveals that x is strictly better than y. Let 13 c is asymmetric and transitive but not necessarily negatively transitive.
us denote this relation by x c y. If there is no direct test to decide whether we have x c y or y c x, we will look for an indirect test. If there exists a sequence of direct tests, i.e.,
x c x 1 , x 1 c x 2 , . . . , x n c y, the decision maker indirectly reveals that x is strictly better than y, which is denoted by x c y. By construction, c is the transitive closure of c (i.e.
the minimal transitive order containing c ). Notice that c is transitive by construction.
Furthermore, it is also acyclical. To see this, if x c x 1 c · · · x n c x, then, by the construction of c , c must have a cycle, say x cx1 c · · · cxm c x (m ≥ n). Then it is easy to show that the Dominating Anchor axiom is violated for S = {x,x 1 , . . . ,x m }.
Since P is transitive, P must include c . In Appendix, we also prove that any ranking 
Context-Free Consideration Sets
In the previous subsection, we provide a general model of choice by iterative eliminations without putting any structure on consideration sets: Ω depends on both x and S in an arbitrary manner. Above, we also give examples where the consideration sets depend on the budget in a trivial way. That is, there is a set of alternatives which are comparable to x no matter what the budget set is, denoted by Ω * (x), and the consideration set of x under choice problem S consists of alternatives that are both comparable to x and feasible. We call this particular class of consideration sets context-free consideration sets. Formally, We first study the properties of a CIE with context-free consideration sets. Because this is a special class of a CIE model, it must satisfy the Anchor Bias axiom. 14 Consider a decision maker who follows a CIE model where x = c({x, y, z}, z) and y = c({y, z}, z). If y = z, this is equivalent to x = c({x, y}, y) so it must be xP y by Proposition 1. On the other hand, if y = z, we cannot conclude xP y because yP xP z, {y, z} = Ω(z, {y, z}) and {x, z} = Ω(z, {x, y, z}) can explains her behavior. However, if her consideration set is known to be context-free, she must have xP y even when y = z. Because of y = c({y, z}, z), we must have yP z and y ∈ Ω * (z), which means that she must have directly compared y and z, discarded z and chosen y. Now, we investigate how she chooses x under extended choice problem ({x, y, z}, z).
There are two possibilities:
• x ∈ Ω * (z), in this case she must have xP y. If yP x, she would have jumped to y from z and never gotten to x.
• x ∈ Ω * (z), in this case she must have moved from z to y and then chosen x afterwards.
It must be xP y as well.
Therefore, the above information reveals her ranking. If this ranking has a cycle, it cannot be represented by a CIE with context-free consideration sets. Therefore, we define a particular revealed preference, c , x c y if x = c({x, y, z}, z) and y = c({y, z}, z) for some z = x( possibly equal to y).
A1:
c is acyclical.
Now suppose x = c(S, x). This reveals that there is some alterative in S which she she compares x with and is better than x. Because of context-free consideration sets, that item will be compared with x whenever it is in her budget set, so x will be always eliminated.
Formally,

A2
: If x = c(S, x), there exists y ∈ S such that x = c(T, x) whenever y ∈ T .
We say y blocks x if y = c({x, y}, x). Let B x be the set of alternatives blocking x, and x itself.
Now suppose that only a, b, and c are elements within S that blocks x. That is, all of them are in Ω * (x) and P -better than x. Suppose a is the best element of these three elements. Then, it is easy to see that (i) she chooses a from {a, b, c, x} when x is her starting point and (ii) if her budget set is smaller than S but still includes a, then she will jump to a starting from x (she may subsequently discard a to choose some other element), so her final choice does not change whether she starts from x or a. Formally, A3: c(T, x) = c(T, c(B x ∩ S, x)) whenever T ⊂ S and c(B x ∩ S, x) ∈ T .
It turns out that these axioms, in addition to Anchor Bias, are not only necessary but also sufficient for an extended choice function to be represented by a CIE model with context-free consideration sets. The proof for sufficiency is given in Appendix.
THEOREM 2: An extended choice function c satisfies the Anchor Bias axiom and A1-3 if, and only if, c is a CIE with context-free consideration sets.
III. Limited Data: The starting point is not observable
Our revealed preference approach is based on the assumption that we can observe not only what the decision maker chooses from a budget set but also which alternative she initially con- Then there must exist a starting point which leads her to pick y. Of course, this starting point may not be unique, for example, different starting points might result in the same final choice, y = c(S, x) = c(S, z). At the same time, given a fixed budget set, different final choices might be observed depending on starting points, y = c(S, x) and w = c(S, z). Let c be an extended choice function. We define the induced choice correspondence, denoted by
y ∈ C c (S) if there exists x 0 such that y = c(S, x 0 )
In other words, y ∈ C c (S) means "y is chosen from S for some starting point, y = c(S, x 0 )." This is in line with what Sen [1993] says that "... it may be useful to interpret C(S) as the set of "choosable" elements -the alternatives that can be chosen." 15 Hence x, y ∈ C c (S)
does not necessarily imply that x is indifferent to y, it simply means that both x and y are choosable under some circumstances.
The induced choice correspondence, C c , is what one can observe when the decision maker follows particular CIE, c, but her starting point is unobservable. In other words, C c is only available data to an outside observer who knows that the choices of the decision maker are affected by the starting point but does not have information on the starting points.
Now imagine that we observe Mr. Deman's choice correspondence C. We wonder whether he actually follows some CIE or not. In other words, we would like to determine if there exists a CIE, say c, which induces his choice correspondence, i.e. C = C c . The answer is yes if and only if his choice correspondence satisfies a simple axiom called the Bliss Point
Axiom. This result makes it possible to distinguish decision makers following a CIE even with limited data.
First, we point out that an induced choice correspondence may violate the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, which has been considered one of the weakest consistency requirement in the literature. IIA states that if something is choosable from some set, it must be choosable from any of its subsets. Formally,
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA):
For any x ∈ C(S), if
EXAMPLE 2: (Search until price starts to increase) 16 Consider a circular shopping mall as in Figure 2 . Ms. Dema is committed to buy a particular commodity from one of the shops in the mall. The prices vary from shop to shop (but each shop's price is fixed) and depending on a day, some of shops may be closed. She arrives at one of parking lots surrounding the mall and goes to the nearest opened shop, say shop b, to check the price.
After that, she walks on the hallway clockwise to the next opened shop to compare its price with b's price. If b's price is cheaper, then she walks back to shop b and buy. Otherwise, she further investigates the next opened shop in the clockwise direction. She stops searching whenever she observes a higher price than the one in the shop she previously visited, and buys from the previous shop, which is indeed the cheapest shop among those she has checked.
It is routine to check her behavior is a CIE but cannot be represented with context-free consideration sets. This example is similar to Example 6 in Rubinstein and Salant [2006] . 17 Let S be a set of currently opened shops. Her ranking P over shops is based on their prices -cheaper is better. Her consideration set Ω(x, S) consists of shop x and the next opened shop in the clockwise direction.
For example, when S = {a, b, d}, then Ω(b, S) = {b, d}. That is, b ∈ C c ({b, c, d}) and b ∈ C c ({b, d}), which is a violation of IIA.
In the example above, C c violates IIA, as b is choosable from a bigger set {b, c, d}, but not from a smaller set {b, d}. Nevertheless, we claim that her induced choice behavior enjoys some kind of consistency in the flavor of IIA: the cheapest shop d is always choosable
whenever it is open. This observation hints at our Bliss Point axiom.
The Bliss Point Axiom (BP Axiom): For any S ∈ K(X), there exists x ∈ C(S) such that if x ∈ T ⊂ S then x ∈ C(T ). We call such x a bliss point of
S.
The BP axiom states that for any budget set S, some of choosable alternatives from S must be always chosen from smaller decision problems. while IIA dictates that all choosable alternatives should be choosable from any smaller choice problem (whenever they are available). Therefore, the BP axiom is weaker than IIA, and provides an alternative foundation for choice theories, while still not allowing a choice cycle.
Similar to how the Dominating Anchor axiom prevents our decision maker from being money pumped, the Bliss Point axiom makes the decision maker immune to infinite moneypumping. To illustrate this, assume that all elements in S are used to make her a victim of money-pumping. The BP axiom implies that there exists at least one bliss point of S, say
x.Whenever x is available, the decision maker may pick x. After that, she is never willing to pay to switch from x because x is choosable from any subset of S. Therefore, x should not be included in any offer during the money-pumping process. Given that, only elements of S \ {x} can be used to extract money from her. However, the BP axiom guarantees that there is a bliss point of S \ {x} as well, which cannot be used for money-pumping for the same reason above. Then recursively, no element can be used for money-pumping so she cannot be a victim of infinite money-pumping. 18 Conversely, anyone whose choice behavior violates the BP axiom can be money-pumped, as described for the CIE model.
In this paper, our main interest is the CIE model where a decision maker employs a constrained search process. The significance of the Bliss Point axiom, for this paper, is to identify choice behavior which can be generated by an underlying CIE model. However, the Bliss Point axiom itself is a completely new postulate which is related to the famous money pump argument. Therefore, it deserves more attention. Masatlioglu and Nakajima (2008) provide characterization for choice correspondences satisfying the Bliss Point Axiom. This new framework makes it possible to provide two more characterizations for IIA and Simon's satisficing.
The next theorem shows that BP guarantees the existence of underlying choice by iterative elimination.
THEOREM 3: A choice correspondence C satisfies Bliss Point if and only if there exists a CIE choice function c such that C c = C.
The power of Theorem 3 is that it connects choice patterns which are considered "irrational" in traditional choice theory to our choice by iterative elimination model which captures bounded rationality. It provides a very simple and intuitive postulate to identify CIE decision makers with limited observations.
While the proof of Theorem 3 is provided in the Appendix, we illustrate that any induced choice correspondence must satisfy the Bliss Point Axiom. Note that the P -best element 18 Here, while finitely many rounds of money-pumping is possible if the decision maker actually chooses something other than bliss points of S, eventually, one of the bliss points must be chosen. Otherwise, there is no observed bliss point, which is a violation of BP.
within S will be chosen from any subset of S whenever it is the starting point. Therefore, that element must be included in the induced choice correspondence for any subset of S. In other words, the P -best element is a bliss point of S since it can never be eliminated by any element within S.
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One can provide a similar result for the CIE models with context-free consideration sets.
A choice correspondence C is generated by an acyclical binary relation, , if and only if there exists a CIE choice function with context-free consideration sets c such that C c = C.
To prove this, given , one should have xP y and x ∈ Ω * (y) if x y. For the other direction, define x y if xP y and x ∈ Ω * (y).
IV. Related Literature
In this section, we review the models related to our model and discuss their relationships.
Exogenous Reference Point
Our CIE model is closely related to the literature on reference-dependent preferences, specifically, Tversky and Kahneman [1991] , Masatlioglu and Ok [2005] , and Salant and Rubinstein [2008] where the reference point is exogenously given. A major difference of the present work from these studies is that the CIE model is a sequential choice procedure, as opposed to their static models. Our model provides a complete description of a dynamic search model. A second major difference is that we do not assume our decision maker's behavior can be expressed by a preference ordering when the reference point (starting point) is fixed. We have seen that, for a fixed starting point, our decision maker can violate IIA. Tversky and Kahneman [1991] introduce the first reference-dependent model where losses have a greater impact on the utility compared to corresponding gains (loss aversion). Since the loss aversion model of Tversky and Kahneman [1991] allows strict cycles, it cannot be a special case of the CIE model. 20 Another concern with loss aversion models is the absence of a welfare criteria. However, the CIE model provides a ranking (possibly incomplete) to make welfare comparisons. To make a comparison, we assume that f is a starting point. Even under this restrictive interpretation, our model is not a special case of theirs since they assume the decision maker has frame-dependent preferences. On the other hand, it is possible to find an example which satisfies their axioms but not ours. As we discuss above, as opposed to us, they assume decision maker uses a particular rationale when the frame is fixed. Rubinstein and Salant [2006] introduce an interesting framework where a decision maker chooses from a list that is an ordered sequence of alternatives. Even though their paper does not directly model reference-dependent preferences, we can interpret the first element in a list as a starting point or a reference point. However, even our context-free consideration sets model does not belong the class of choice behavior they defined.
Endogenous Reference Point
In the CIE model, the induced choice correspondence is also closely related to the literature on reference-dependent preferences, especially when the reference point is endogenous. We investigate the relation between our model and the personal equilibrium proposed in Köszegi and Rabin [2006] .
They propose a model of reference-dependence in which the reference point is determined endogenously. In their model, they assume the existence of an underlying referencedependent choice function 22 c RD (S, x) where the reference point is what the decision maker expects to buy (an expectation).
23 Whenever the expectation matches with the actual choice,
i.e. x = c RD (S, x) -x is a rational expectation, and x is a personal equilibrium or self-fulfilling plan. Formally,
where P E c RD (S) is the set of personal equilibria for the budget set S. Therefore, any personal equilibrium is an endogenous reference point.
As a result of this framework, there might be multiple endogenous reference points: if the decision maker expects to choose x from the choice problem S, she chooses x and, if she expects to choose y from the choice problem S, she chooses y. In other words, both x and y are choosable depending on the decision maker's initial expectation, i.e. x = c RD (S, x) and y = c RD (S, y). Therefore, P E c RD can be viewed as a choice correspondence.
Since c RD is not observable, the question is "how do we know that a choice correspondence constitutes personal equilibria?" Gul and Pesendorfer (2006) show that a choice correspondence is generated by a acyclical binary relation if and only if there exists a reference dependent choice function c RD such that C is equivalent to induced personal equilibrium. In other words, C is the set of personal equilibria which are induced by the referencedependent choice function c RD (S, x).
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Many choice theories, including classical choice theory, ignore any information other 22 For simplicity, we will assume c RD is a function rather than a correspondence. 23 Here, x represents both the actual good x and the expectation that good x will be purchased. 24 See Proposition 1 in Gul and Pesendorfer [2006] for the formal proof. 25 Actually, Theorem 3 says that C(S) = y∈S c RD (S, y). Because of the Anchor Bias axiom, if c RD is a CIE then the induced choice correspondence consists of the fixed points of c RD . Therefore, the induced choice correspondence is equal to the set of personal equilibrium.
than the choices of the decision maker. To compare our framework with those models, we focus on the induced choice correspondence. First of all, since the induced choice allows IIA to be violated, any choice model satisfying IIA will be a special case of our model.
However, this does not mean that any behavior violating IIA is captured by our induced choice correspondence. This is because if a choice correspondence satisfies the Bliss Point axiom, it does not allow infinite money pump.
Our model accommodates wide range of behavior which are seemigly irrational: "do not buy the cheapest" procedure 26 , "stop search when price starts to increase" procedure, the Attraction effect and the Reference effect. However there are other choice procedures which lie outside of our model such as the (u, v) procedure (Kalai et al. [2002] ), the "second-best"
procedure (Baigent and Gaertner [1996] ), the "median" procedure (Gaertner and Xu [1999] ), the Compromise effect and the Similarity effect. The reason is that they all allow strict cycles which isn't permitted in our model.
Finally, we would like to end this section by discussing the model of Manzini and Mariotti [2007] , since like us, they provide a boundedly rational model where the cognitive load of a decision maker is minimal. They have proposed a model in which the decision maker uses two rationales (possibly more) to make decision. In the first step, she shortlists the non-dominated alternatives using the first rationale. A shortlist reduces the number of comparisons (or the cognitive load) as do our consideration sets. In the second step, she considers only this shortlist and select the non-dominated alternatives using a second rationale. Unlike our model, their model allows strict choice cycles even when the choice correspondence is single valued. 27 This is because of the interaction of two rationales. However, our model is not a special case of theirs when the choice function is multi-valued. For example, the following choice behavior, C({x, y, z}) = {x, y, z}, C({x, y}) = {x}, C({y, z}) = {y}, C({x, z}) = {x}, satisfies the Bliss Point axiom. However, no matter how many rationales are used, this 26 Consider a costumer who follows the old adage "you shouldn't buy the cheapest wine on the menu."
This behavior violates IIA in general. 27 Note that if we work with a choice function instead of a choice correspondence, the Bliss Point axiom is equivalent to the standard preference maximization.
behavior cannot be captured by the model of Manzini and Mariotti [2007] . Therefore, neither of these two models imply each other.
V. Appendix
A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: The proof of the "if" part is left to readers. Now suppose c satisfies the Anchor Bias axiom and the Dominating Anchor axiom. Take any ranking P c which includes c defined in the main section. Notice that the Dominating Anchor axiom guarantees c to be acylical (and be transitive because it is a transitive closure of c . 28 Now, we define the comparable sets as follows:
Now we show that (P c , Ω) represents c. If x = c(S, x), by construction, Ω(x, S) contains only x. That is, there is no element which can eliminate x. Suppose c(S, x) = y = x. Then, by construction, Ω(x, S) is equal to {x, y}. By the construction of c , we have y c x. Hence yP c x, so y is the P c -best element of Ω(x, S). This means x will be discarded and y will be the starting point in the next round. Then we need to show that actually y will be chosen in this round. By the Anchor Bias axiom, y = c(S, x) implies y = c(S, y). By construction, it is Ω(y, S) = {y} so y is the P c -best element of Ω(y, S). Therefore, the pair of (P c , Ω) represents c.
Proof of Proposition 1:
The proof of the "if" part is exactly equal to the proof of the "only if" part of Theorem 1's proof because the choice of P c was arbitrary within those including c . The other way is provided in the main body just before the statement of Proposition 1.
Proof of Theorem 2: Let c be an extended choice function satisfying all axioms stated in Theorem 2. As in the main section, define x c y if and only if there exists z (possibly equal 28 Szpilrajn [1930] established that every strict partial order can be embedded within a strict weak order.
to y) such that x = c (xyz, z) and y = c (yz, z)
By A1, c is acylical, so we can find ranking P c which includes c . and define
Claim 1: x = c(S, x) if and only if Ω * (x) ∩ S = {x}.
Proof of Claim 1: Suppose x = c(S, x). Then A2 requires that there exists y ∈ S such that x = c(T, x) whenever y ∈ S. Particularly. it must be y = c({x, y}, x). Therefore,
, then the contrapositive of A2 implies x = c({x, y}, x)
for any y ∈ S. Therefore, Ω * (x) = {x}.
Claim 2: Ω * (x) ∩ S has the unique P c -best element for all S.
Proof of Claim 2: First observe that if y = x and y ∈ Ω * (x) then by Claim 1 we have y = c({x, y}, x) and x = c({x}, x) so it must be yP c x (remember that P c is a ranking including c ). Next, take any two distinct y, z ∈ Ω * (x) where y, z = x. Then we have y = c({xy}, x), z = c ({xz}, x). By Claim 1, y and z block x. Hence c ({xyz}, x) cannot be x. If it is y then yP z. Therefore, for any two distinct elements in Ω * (x), say a and b, it must be either aP c b or bP c a. Since P c is a ranking, it never contains a cycle so Ω * (x) ∩ S must have the unique P c -best element.
Claim 2 guarantees that (P c , Ω * ) can represent a CIE with context-free consideration sets. Let us denote it by c * .
Claim 3: c(Ω * (x) ∩ S, x) = c * (Ω * (x) ∩ S, x) for any (S, x).
Proof of Claim 3:
If Ω * (x) ∩ S includes only x, the statement is trivial so assume that it includes some elements other than x. Let y be the P c best element in Ω * (x) ∩ S. By definition of c * , y = c * (Ω * (x) ∩ S, x). Suppose c(Ω * (x) ∩ S, x) = z = y. Since {x, y, z} ⊂ S
and Ω * (x) = B x , A3 implies c({x, y, z}, x) = c({x, y, z}, c(Ω * (x) ∩ {x, y, z})) = z
Since y ∈ Ω * (x), we have y = c({x, y}, x). Therefore, we have z c y, implying zP c y.
This contradicts that y is the P c best element within Ω * (x) ∩ S.
Now we are ready to complete the proof.
Claim 4: c(S, x) = c * (S, x) for any (S, x).
Proof of Claim 4: For any S, make its partition recursively as follows: Finally, since x ∈ I S k and y ∈ Ω * (x) ∩ S, it must be y ∈ I S l for some l < k. Therefore, by the inductive hypothesis we have c(S, y) = c * (S, y). Therefore, c(S, x) = c * (S, x).
By Claim 4, we have reached the required result.
Proof of Theorem 3: Suppose choice correspondence C is induced by a CIE represented by (P, Ω). Then P -undominated element in S (i.e. x ∈ S such that there is no y ∈ S with yP x.) will be a bliss point of S. This is because for any T ⊂ S, Ω(x, T ) never includes an element which is P -better than x so x = c(T, x) for all T ⊂ S (as long as x ∈ T ). Thus, we have x ∈ C(T ) for any T ⊂ S including x.
Conversely, let C satisfy the BP axiom. To construct P from a choice correspondence, we utilize the notion of bliss points. The BP axiom guarantees the existence of a bliss point in any choice problem, particularly in X. Since bliss points of X are never eliminated, it is natural to put them on the top of the ranking. Then in the next step, we will remove all the bliss points of X from X. Now consider bliss points of this strictly smaller set. They cannot be eliminated in the absence of bliss points of X, so we put them into the second layer.
Formally, we recursively define P starting from the grand set, X and construct a partition of X. Let X = X 0 and I 0 = {x ∈ X 0 | x ∈ C(T ) for all T s.t. x ∈ T ⊂ X 0 }.
Note that I 0 is the set of bliss points of X 0 . BP implies that I 0 is non-empty. Define
If it is non-empty, define I 1 = {x ∈ X 1 | x ∈ C(T ) for all T s.t. x ∈ T ⊂ X 1 }.
BP also implies that I 1 is non-empty. Then define recursively, I k = {x ∈ X k | x ∈ C(T ) for all T s.t. x ∈ T ⊂ X k } where X k = X k−1 \ I k−1 until I k = X. Note that {I n } is a partition of X, and X n 's are nested. Given the partition {I n }, we can define P xP y if x ∈ I k , y ∈ I l and k < l.
Since X is finite, this recursive process will end in finite time. where y x,S is an arbitrary element in S with y x,S P x. We need to prove that such an element exists whenever x ∈ C(S). Suppose such an element does not exist and x ∈ I k . Then by 29 We will discuss for countable infinite case in Appendix.
definition of P , any element in S is in X k . Since x is a bliss point of X k , it must be x ∈ C(S), which is a contradiction. Therefore, Ω is well defined.
Let c be a CIE represented by (P, Ω). This is indeed well defined because Ω(x, S) has a unique P -best element for any (x, S). Now, we need to show that c induces C. If x ∈ C(S) then x = c(S, x) because Ω(x, S) is a singleton. By the definition of C c , x ∈ C c (S). On the other hand, If x / ∈ C(S) then x = c(S, x) = x because Ω(x, S) contains an element which is P -better than x. By the contrapositive of the Anchor Bias axiom, x = C(S, y) for any y ∈ S. Therefore, x / ∈ C c (S).
